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Abstract
   The self/non-self model, first proposed by F.M. Burnet, has dominated immunology for
sixty years now. According to this model, any foreign element will trigger an immune reaction
in an organism, whereas  endogenous elements will not, in normal circumstances, induce an
immune  reaction.  In  this  paper  we  show  that  the  self/non-self  model  is  no  longer  an
appropriate explanation of experimental data in immunology, and that this inadequacy may be
rooted in an excessively strong metaphysical conception of biological identity. We suggest
that  another  hypothesis,  one  based  on  the  notion of  continuity,  gives  a  better  account  of
immune phenomena. Finally, we underscore the mapping between this metaphysical deflation
from self to  continuity in immunology and the philosophical debate between substantialism
and empiricism about identity.
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1. Introduction
   The immunological self/non-self model, proposed by F.M. Burnet in the 1940s, is almost
universally accepted nowadays among immunologists (Langman and Cohn 2000). This model
was built to offer a criterion of immunogenicity, that is, to answer the fundamental question
'when (in what circumstances) does an immune reaction occur in a given organism?'.  The
self/non-self model provides the following answer: any element which is foreign (non-self) to
an organism will trigger an immune reaction if introduced to it, whereas endogenous elements
(self) do not, in normal circumstances, induce an immune reaction. Because immunology has
been one of the key domains of the molecularization of biology since the 1960s, the discipline
is currently torn between a very strong molecular programme, and a theoretical framework
borrowed mainly from psychology1 and philosophy (Burnet 1965). It seems worthwhile to ask
on which principles the self/non-self model was built, what its origins are, and whether it is a
satisfactory model.
   Here we show, using experimental  evidence,  that  the self/non-self  model  is  no longer
appropriate  to  account  for  the  available  immunological  data  as  a  whole,  and  that  this
inadequacy may be rooted in an excessively strong metaphysical conception of biological
identity. We suggest that another theoretical model, one based on the notion of  continuity,
gives a better account of immune phenomena. As we will see, this model may be conceived of
as the immunological part  of biological genidentity2,  which has been recently renewed by
Boniolo and Carrara (2004).
   We analyse first the standard view, that is, the self/non-self model (section 2); then we
present experimental arguments showing the inadequacy of this model (section 3); after which
we argue that the continuity hypothesis gives a better account of immunological data (section
4); and finally we discuss the metaphysical roots of the two conceptions of biological identity
underlying these two models, that is, substance versus continuity (sections 5 and 6).
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2. The standard view: the immune ‘self’
   The theory of the immune self  has dominated immunology for sixty years. Leaning on
Ehrlich's principle of horror autotoxicus (Ehrlich 1900), F.M. Burnet suggested the immune
self/non-self hypothesis for the first time in 1949 (Burnet and Fenner, 1949). The origins and
developments of this model were rich and complex (Löwy 1991, Tauber (ed.) 1991, Tauber
1994, Silverstein and Rose 1997), but the general theoretical framework remained the same.
According to the self model, every foreign element ('non-self') triggers an immune reaction of
defense from the organism, whereas no component of the organism ('self') triggers an immune
reaction (Burnet 1949: 100-102; Burnet 1960). In other words, everything that comes from the
inside  (endogenous)  is  tolerated  and  preserved,  whereas  everything  that  comes  from  the
outside (exogenous) is attacked. Hence, the  integrity  of the organism is maintained (Burnet
1962).  A critical  example of  this  self/non-self  discrimination  is  the fact  that  an organism
accepts a graft of its own tissues (autograft), whereas it rejects a graft from a foreign organism
(allograft).  The  'self'  can  thus  be  defined  as  a  closed  fortress (Wilson  1972:  8-10).  The
principles of the self model have been based on observations dealing with pathogens (Burnet
1941, 1949), grafts rejection/acceptance (Murphy 1913, Billingham et al. 1953), thymectomy
(Miller 1961), and MHC (Major Histocompatibility Complex) presentation (Zinkernagel et al.
1978).  Particularly,  the  demonstration  that,  in  a  given  organism,  lymphocytes  bearing
receptors specific for an antigen are deleted if the genes that code for this antigen are present
in the genome of this organism (negative selection) (Kappler et al. 1987) was seen as a strong
confirmation of the self model. 
   A critical question here is: how is the immune 'self' defined in the self/non-self theory? The
boundaries  of  the immune 'self'  are not  the same as  those of  the organism:  since a  graft
between two identical twins is tolerated, these two individuals have the same immune 'self'.
Hence,  the  immune  self  is  not  equivalent  to  what  is  'under  the  skin'  of  an  organism.
3
Nonetheless, the immune self is not equivalent to the genomic self either, because the immune
self is acquired and not innate: it is defined in the process of selection of immunocompetent
cells,  that is,  as suggested above, the elimination of all  the immune cells that react to the
components of the organism that are presented to them (Burnet 1957, 1959; for an example in
contemporary research, see Walker and Abbas 2001). This selection occurs in the foetal or
immediately post-natal  period,  depending on  species.  If,  during this  period,  some entities
genetically different from the organism are introduced in it, it will not launch any immune
reaction against them later: "cells 'foreign' to the host may be tolerated indefinitely provided
that they are implanted early in embryonic life" (Burnet and Fenner 1949: 76). Hence, the
immune self is  based  on the genomic self (because most of the time, without any external
intervention, the molecular patterns on the basis of which immune cells are selected come
from the  host)  but  is  not  equivalent to  it.  Thus,  the  basic  rule  of  the  self  model  is  the
following: molecular patterns originating in the genome of the organism, those presented to it
during  the  fœtal/immediately  post-natal  period,  and  those  identical  to  them,  define  the
immune  'self'.  Accordingly,  they  do  not  trigger  an  immune  reaction.  All  other  patterns
constitute the immune 'non-self', and as a consequence activate a reaction. 
   The  'self'  framework  still  constitutes  today  the  standard  view  in  all  the  aspects  of
immunology:  innate  immunity  (Medzhitov  and  Janeway  2002),  selection  of
immunocompetent lymphocytes (Walker and Abbas 2001), MHC presentation (Garcia et al.
1998), autoimmunity (Pedotti et al. 2001), tumour immunity (Nanda and Sercarz 1995), HIV
infection (Douek et al. 2003), etc.
3. Problems with the standard view: the inadequacy of the self model
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   The self/non-self has been called into question both conceptually (Jerne 1974, Tauber 1994,
Tauber  1999,  Cohen  2000),  and  experimentally  (Matzinger,  Gallucci  et  al.  1999,  Cohen
1992).  Alfred  Tauber  made  a  critical  contribution  on  this  issue:  he  showed  the  relation
between  the  definition  of  immunity and  the  various  conceptions  of  identity,  and  hence
underlined  specifically  the  metaphysical  roots  of  the  self/non-self  model,  and  also  its
vagueness. The immunological 'self', remarked Tauber in his incisive book (Tauber 1994),
cannot be considered as a scientific concept, it is no more than a metaphor.
   Though our method is quite different, because we start from experimental data and only then
examine the metaphysical aspects, we believe that it is possible to go further in this critique,
and that the data accumulated in very recent immunology clearly prove the inadequacy of the
self/non-self model (Pradeu and Carosella 2004). Here we demonstrate that, contrary to the
assertion of the self/non-self model, 'self' components do induce immune reactions, and many
'non-self'  components  do  not,  and  consequently that  the  distinction  between  internal and
external origins of entities is not adequate for a proper understanding of  immune phenomena.
3.1. Falsity of the principle 'no entity originating from the organism will trigger
an immune reaction'
   From its  birth,  the  self  model,  built  on the  foundations  of  Ehrlich's  theory of  horror
autotoxicus (Ehrlich 1900), defined autoimmunity as a pathological exception to the principle
of absence of immune attack against  the 'self':  autoimmunity was seen as a disorder with
regard to normal immune functioning. By contrast, Jerne suggested that immune cells could
react  constantly  to  components  of  the  organism,  defining  autoimmunity  as  an  ongoing
surveillance process and not as an abnormal destruction (Jerne 1974). Nowadays, a revised
version of this thesis is supported by strong evidence. During the selection of lymphocytes in
primary  lymphoid  organs  (that  is,  thymus  for  T  lymphocytes,  and  bone  marrow  for  B
lymphocytes), cells which react strongly to the patterns presented to them and those which do
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not react to these patterns are eliminated. Hence, a lymphocyte survives in primary lymphoid
organs if, and only if, it reacts weakly to the 'self' constituants (Ashton-Rickardt et al. 1994),
and not if it does not react at all. Furthermore, this selection continues throughout the lifetime
of  the organism:  in  peripheral  organs  (spleen,  lymph nodes,  etc.)  circulating lymphocytes
which do not react to 'self' antigens die (Freitas and Rocha 1999). Immune reaction to the 'self'
is not only possible, but also necessary for a sound immune system. What do we mean in this
case  when we say that  immune cells  'react'  to  the self?  We mean that,  constantly,  some
immune cells interact with normal, endogenous components of the organism (most of the time
by binding to them). This interaction (the affinity and specificity of which can be evaluated)
between the immune receptors and the 'self' ligands, nonetheless, is a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for the immune response, that is, the  activation of immune cells, or, in
other words, the triggering of a cascade of modifications and  effector  mechanisms (such as
cytokines production, phagocytosis, lysis, etc.).
   However, immune reaction to 'self' components is not limited to mere interaction: we can
also  observe  immune  responses to  'self'  components,  that  is,  the  activation,  by  'self'
components, of immune cells and immune molecules. One critical case of such activation is
the  phagocytosis  (internalization  and destruction)  of cells  of  the organism which undergo
changes in their patterns, particularly dead cells (by apoptosis, that is, programmed cell death).
These cells are 'self' cells, but firstly they are recognized by immune cells as entities to be
destroyed, and secondly some immune effector functions are triggered (Savill et al. 2002).
Moreover, research on regulatory T cells (TReg) undertaken during the past two decades points
in the same direction.  TReg are lymphocytes that  respond to other, normal,  lymphocytes in
order to control their  activation.  In other words, the role of TReg is  to stop or slow down
immune reactions. TReg are 'self' cells that respond to other 'self' cells, and they are thought to
be involved in the balance of autoimmunity, in tolerance of tumours, etc. (Sakaguchi 2004).
Phagocytosis of dead cells and auto-regulation of T lymphocytes illustrate clearly the fact that
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the immune system is a set of homeostatic processes, in which reactions to 'self' components
are  indispensable  and  involve  most  of  the  time  effector  mechanisms  similar  to  those
responsible  for  reactions  to  pathogens  (Savill  2002  et  al.).  It  is  very  likely  that  other
components of the immune system have the same capacity to be activated by immune 'self'
constituants, with the role of controlling (downregulating) their functioning.
   Thus,  immune  reactions  (interaction  and  response)  to  'self'  constituants  are  not  only
possible, but also necessary. We can conclude that the principle "the immune system does not
react to the 'self'" is false.
3.2. Falsity of the principle 'every foreign (originating from the outside) entity
will trigger an immune reaction'
   Here we lean on the concept of  immune tolerance,  which is defined as the  absence of
immune response towards an antigen. Naturally, 'self' has long been described as inducing
tolerance, and, by contrast, 'non-self' is supposed not to trigger tolerance, except in a few cases
(Burnet 1970: 46-49). The problem is that the more one looks at this question, the more one
finds exceptions to the principle: 
 i) Tolerance of bacteria. Many bacteria live in organisms without inducing immune effector
reactions, and, in some cases, they are even beneficial to the host, especially on the mucosal
surfaces  (lungs,  gut,  sensory  organs,  organs  of  reproduction).  The  gut  is  thought  to  be
colonized by 1014 commensal microorganisms, which contribute to the defense of the host,
and to its digestive capacity (Berg 1996). The surface of the skin is also rich in bacteria.
 ii) Tolerance of parasites, i.e. protozoan parasites and parasitic worms (helminths). Parasites
display, most of the time, large quantities of antigens at their surface, and yet in many cases
they induce either no immune response, or no effective immune response (e.g. Malaria, which
is caused by various species of the genus Plasmodium, and infects nearly 10% of the world's
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population). Many parasites, such as  Trypanosoma Cruzi, remain several years in the body
without being eliminated by the immune system (Buscaglia and Di Noia 2003)3.
 iii) Tolerance of grafts. Some organs, called immunoprivileged organs (brain, eye, testis), do
not reject alloantigens in case of transplantation (Ferguson and Griffith 1997). 
 iv)  Foetomaternal  tolerance.  Pregnancy is  the most  common,  and the only non-artificial,
graft, and we can observe that, in the great majority of situations, the fœtus is not rejected by
the mother. Although its genome is semi-different from that of the mother, the fœtus does not
trigger an immune reaction, or is protected against such a reaction. Induction of tolerance
mechanisms, such as those due to the molecule of the Human Leukocyte Antigen called HLA-
G (Carosella et al. 2003) and regulatory T cells (Aluvihare et al. 2004) have been proved to
play a critical role in the acceptance of the fœtus. 
 v)  Chimerism.  The  term  chimerism  refers  to  the  process  by which  cells  are  exchanged
between two organisms and maintained in  at  least  one of them, in  spite  of their  'foreign'
character. Different forms of chimerisms exist – twin cattle (Owen 1945), marmosets (Haig
1999),  etc.  –  but  the  most  striking  example  is  foetomaternal  chimerism:  components
originating from the child have been found in the mother's organism up to 27 years after birth
(Bianchi et al. 1996). 
   Thus, 'self' does sometimes trigger an immune reaction; 'non-self' very often does not trigger
any immune reaction. The self/non-self model is compelled therefore to define a series of
exceptions to its own principles: tumour cells, apoptotic cells, for instance, are said to belong
to the 'non-self', and commensal bacteria or the fœtus are conceived of as parts of the 'self',
which makes no sense with regard to the initial meaning of these two concepts, and creates a
constant obscurity. Immunologists can ultimately have no other choice than to give, as an
explanation  of  immune  triggering,  the  law 'only non-self  components  induce  an  immune
reaction', and, as a  definition of the self, 'that which does not trigger any immune reaction'
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(while the immune non-self is that which does trigger an immune reaction)4. Obviously this is
no explanation at all, but rather a purely logical circle, or a mere name for a phenomenon
(which is far removed from Burnet's aim to find the best and easiest explanation for immune
phenomena).  Every  scientific  hypothesis  can  admit  exceptions,  but  once  the  exceptions
become too numerous, we have to accept the possibility that the general principles are flawed.
We believe that  another conception  permits  us to  evade these exceptions,  and constitutes
therefore a better hypothesis for immunology.
4. The advantages of an alternative view: the continuity hypothesis
   The aim of the continuity hypothesis is to offer an alternative criterion of immunogenicity
with regard to the self hypothesis, that is, an actual explanation (and not a mere description) of
what triggers an immune response and what does not. The continuity hypothesis relies on two
main observations, which we have already mentioned. First, the immune system is acquired
and not innate:  everything that  is  present when the lymphocytic selection occurs will  not
trigger an immune reaction later (see section 2 above). Second,  autoreactivity  is a constant,
normal  and  necessary process  in  every organism.  Here  is  the  principle  of  the  continuity
hypothesis: every strong discontinuity in the interactions between immune receptors and their
targets triggers an immune response. What does this principle mean exactly? This section
endeavours to answer this question. 
   First,  the  immune  receptors  involved  are  those  of  lymphocytes,  dendritic  cells,
macrophages, etc. Their  targets  are epitopes (i.e.  molecular patterns), to which the immune
receptors  bind;  these  epitopes  can  be  either  exogenous ('non-self':  pathogenic  patterns  on
bacteria or viruses, alloantigens in a transplantation, etc.), or  endogenous (tumour markers,
molecular patterns expressed on apoptotic cells,  patterns recognized by regulatory T cells,
etc.)  According  to  the  continuity  hypothesis,  an  immune  response  is  induced  by  the
appearance  of  epitopes  (molecular  patterns)  that  are  different  from  those  to  which  the
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receptors of the immune system constantly react. The immune receptors interact strongly with
these abnormal epitopes, that is, with a strong affinity and/or specificity. Hence, the key is the
advent of something in the immune system that bears  unusual epitopes:  the immune cells
constantly react in a weak manner to the epitopes that remain the same or change very slowly5.
An immune response occurs when an epitope that is strongly different from those to which the
immune  system  constantly  reacts  appears  suddenly6.  Thus,  according  to  the  continuity
hypothesis,  the  immune  system  does  not  discriminate  between  'self'  and  'non-self',  but
between  epitopes  (whether  endogenous  or  exogenous)  that  are  constantly  present  in  the
organism – and hence induce constant interactions with the immune receptors of this organism
–, and epitopes (whether endogenous or exogenous) that strongly break the continuity of these
interactions. This hypothesis requires us to understand more precisely the molecular nature of
changes in cells. 
   So, in what circumstances does an immune response occur, according to our hypothesis? It
occurs  when,  and  only when,  there  is  a  strong  discontinuity  in  the  interactions  between
immune receptors and epitopes, that is, each time the four following conditions are satisfied: 
i)  An  entity  (whether  endogenous  or  exogenous)  that  breaks  the  continuity  of
interactions appears and interacts with the immune system
ii) This entity is in sufficient quantities (very small quantities of antigens do not induce
an immune response, see 'insufficient discontinuity' below)
iii)  The discontinuity due to  this  entity is  perceived by several  components  of the
immune system, so there are several signals of activation
iv) This entity triggers stress signals and/or proinflammatory signals. 
   When, by contrast, is there no effector immune response? In six kinds of circumstances: 
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i)  Continuity:  there  is  no  change  in  the  molecular  patterns  to  which  immune
components react. Hence, we can speak about 'actual continuity' or 'continuity by full absence
of change'. An example is the normal functioning of an immune system. In this situation, there
are no proinflammatory signals, and no modification of tissues. 
ii) Imperceptible discontinuity: changes occur, but the immune system cannot perceive
them,  because there is  no molecular  difference between the  two states.  We can speak of
'continuity  by  similarity'.  Thus,  in  this  case,  there  is  immune continuity in  spite  of  the
appearance of discontinuity from our point of view. Examples of this phenomenon include the
acceptance of grafts between two identical twins, the acceptance of autografts, but also the
preservation  of  continuity  by  molecular  mimicry  in  some  pathogens  (e.g.  the  parasite
Trypanosoma Cruzi: see Girones and Fresno 2003). There are no proinflammatory signals,
and no modification of tissues.
iii) Ignorance: there is no interaction between the immune receptors and the molecular
patterns  of  the  entity.  This  can  be  illustrated  by the  processes  of  isolation  in  'immuno-
privileged' sites: some immune components cannot enter the site, and therefore no recognition
is possible (Ferguson and Griffith 1997).
iv) Insufficient discontinuity: first, if antigens are in insufficient quantities, no immune
reaction occurs (even if there is a discontinuity); second, immune tolerance is  usually the
default situation, which means that several components of the immune system must react to a
given antigen for an immune response to occur. For instance, if a T lymphocyte recognizes its
specific antigen on an antigen-presenting cell which is not itself activated, it dies; it is only if
both cells (APC and T lymphocyte) react strongly to the antigen that an immune response is
triggered. 
v) Inhibition of the response: some pathogens and some tumours induce a decrease in
the production of proinflammatory signals or actively deceive immune cells (Marincola et al.
2000).
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vi) Induction of tolerance: in this case, the entity is perceived by the immune system
and reacts with several of its components, but nonetheless the antigenic patterns involved in
the  reaction  are  here  considered  as  normal  by the  immune  cells  and  are  tolerated.  E.g.:
tolerance of the foetus (which is semi-allogenic) by the mother. In some cases, it even appears
that,  contrary  to  what  usually  happens  in  the  immune  system,  the  more  the  organism
encounters these patterns, the less it responds to them. Example: better tolerance of a graft if
antigens from the donor are injected before the graft (Seung et al. 2003), as if the organism
could get 'used' to some antigens. Why does this happen? First, it is important to understand
that  induction of  tolerance  involves  regulatory immune mechanisms:  an  effector  immune
response can be initiated, but it is subsequently downregulated by the regulatory mechanisms,
mainly the regulatory T cells (Belkaid and Rouse 2005), but also, for instance, the HLA-G
molecule of histocompatibility (Lila et al.  2001) and the regulatory properties of dendritic
cells (Smits et al. 2005). Hence, it is actually a form of induction of tolerance by induction of
continuity, because in these circumstances effector cells which are likely to respond to the
antigen are  downregulated, killed, or rendered anergic by the regulatory components of the
immune system. Thus, a new continuity is established between the immune receptors and this
antigen (the immune cells with the strongest affinity or specificity being ruled out). Now, the
question  is:  in  what circumstances  do  such  regulatory mechanisms  outweigh  the  effector
ones? Such a process, in which a discontinuity leads not to the destruction of an antigen but
rather to tolerance, has both evolutionary (e.g. tolerance of foetus) and co-evolutionary (e.g.
tolerance of some bacteria) reasons. More precisely, though, we can say that the conditions of
this process are probably the following: small quantities of antigen (or progressive increasing
of antigenic quantities), progressive contacts between the antigen and the immune receptors,
no proinflammatory signals, no stress signals, no tissue damage. The absence of damage is
critical here, since immunologists have long known that the same antigen  may or may not
trigger an immune reaction, depending on whether damage occurs or not. We believe that
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foetomaternal tolerance, foetomaternal chimerism, induction of tolerance in tumour cells, and
some kinds of tolerance to pathogens (especially to some parasites), could all be examples of
induction of continuity.
   So, what is exactly the difference between the continuity hypothesis and the self hypothesis?
Contrary to  the  self  hypothesis,  the  continuity hypothesis  says  that  'self'  components  are
perfectly  capable  of  triggering  an  immune  activation,  provided  that  there  is  a  break  of
continuity  (eg.:  phagocytosis  of  dead  cells),  and  asserts  that  'non-self'  components  can
perfectly be tolerated by the organism,  provided that  either the break of continuity is  not
perceived  by the  immune  components  (ignorance),  or  the  immune  response  is  prevented
(inhibition), or an active acceptation is induced (induction of tolerance by continuity). 
   Nonetheless,  it  is  necessary  not  only  to  emphasize  the  differences  between  the  two
hypotheses,  but  also  to  prove  that  the  continuity  hypothesis  possesses  advantages  in
comparison  with  the  self  hypothesis.  Several  domains  tend  to  prove  that  the  continuity
hypothesis is a better explanation of immune phenomena than the 'self' hypothesis:
 1°/  Regulation of immunity: the functioning of the immune system as an homeostasis. The
continuity  hypothesis  subsumes  under  a  unique  explanation  the  phagocytosis  of  dead  or
abnormal cells and immune reaction to pathogens: in each case, it is the discontinuity in the
molecular patterns expressed on the cell surface that triggers the immune response7. It offers
also an explanation for normal autoreactivity, that is, the necessity for immune cells to be
stimulated constantly by endogenous components, and the role of regulatory cells, especially
regulatory T cells (TReg). The case of TReg is particularly striking. While the self/non-self model
has great difficulty  in explaining the triggering of regulatory T cells (which can respond to
'self' as well as to 'non-self'), there is no such difficulty with the continuity hypothesis.  TReg
respond to a strong discontinuity in the interactions between their receptors and the epitopes
to which they react (whether 'self' or 'non-self'), exactly like the other immune cells do. The
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only difference is that  TReg downregulate the response mounted by other components of the
immune system. When, in the balance between effector and regulatory mechanisms, the latter
win, we have an induction of tolerance.
 2°/ Tumour cells. Tumour cells, except perhaps those due to oncogenic viruses, are 'self' cells,
in so far as they come from the genome of the individual and are components of the organism.
The continuity hypothesis asserts that tumour cells, in most circumstances, trigger an immune
response, because the molecular patterns expressed at their surface change considerably and
this change thus constitutes a break of continuity8.
 3°/ Tolerance of pathogens, such as commensal bacteria or some parasites: these pathogens,
especially when they do not harm the organism and even play a useful role (example: bacteria
in  the  gut  facilitate  digestion),  induce  a  tolerance  by progressive  induction  of  continuity
(Hooper  and  Gordon  2001).  Leishmania major actively  induces  interleukin  10  (IL-10)
producing TReg, and these TReg prevent the clearance of the parasite by other immune cells
(Belkaid et al. 2002). 
  4°/ Foetomaternal tolerance and chimerism. As suggested previously, in this case, induction
of tolerance (Claas 2004) may be realized by induction of continuity.
   Thus, the continuity hypothesis attempts to give an account of phenomena that the immune
self/non-self  model  does  not  explain,  or  explains  only by using  ad  hoc hypotheses.  The
continuity  hypothesis  offers  a  more  comprehensive  and  less  metaphysically  loaded
explanation  of immunity than  the  self/non-self  model;  hence we think  it  can prepare  the
ground for other ways in which to understand the functioning of the immune system. 
   This alternative hypothesis based on the notion of continuity is rooted in a metaphysical
definition of identity different from the one of the self hypothesis. Indeed, the conceptual shift
from  self to  continuity in  immunology has  a  philosophical  analogue  in  the  metaphysical
deflation from a definition of identity based on substance (identity-substance) to a definition
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of identity based on  continuity (identity-continuity). The process of metaphysical deflation
was operated in philosophy by authors usually, although questionably, subsumed under the
term of 'empiricism'. In the next section we argue that  there is a rich mapping between the
immunological opposition continuity versus self and the philosophical opposition empiricism
versus  substantialism  about  identity,  and  that  these  two  rival  metaphysical  conceptions
underlie implicitly the two scientific hypotheses. Our claim will  be that immunology must
operate  a  shift  from  identity-substance  (self  hypothesis)  to  identity-continuity  (continuity
hypothesis). 
5. The opposition between two metaphysical conceptions of identity: substance  versus
continuity
     First, what do we call 'identity'? A being is defined by two aspects: first, the individual
characteristics that make it distinct and different from everything else (its location in space
and time, its physical and psychological characteristics, etc.); second, the fact that, in spite of
the changes that occur to it, it can be said to remain the 'same' being. These two aspects are
individuality on the one hand, and sameness on the other hand (Wiggins 2001).
   There are two rival definitions, an internalist one and an externalist one, of the identity of an
organism. Since both ways are extreme conceptions, a wide range of conceptions naturally
exists in-between. According to the internalist conception, the fundamental characteristics that
constitute  the  identity  of  an  organism  (that  is,  its  individuality  and  its  sameness)  are
endogenous (that is, they come from the inside of the organism), and everything exogenous
(that is, coming from the outside of the organism) represents a threat to its integrity (that is, to
the maintaining of this self-defining process). According to the externalist conception, on the
other  hand,  the fundamental  characteristics  that  constitute  the identity of an organism are
exogenous, and nothing happens inside an organism without interacting in many ways with
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the  environment.  This  opposition  is  sketched out  clearly by Richard  Lewontin  (Lewontin
2000). In this section, we suggest that the immunological self hypothesis tends to belong to
the  internalist  conception,  whereas  the  immunological  continuity hypothesis  constitutes  a
strong suggestion to move towards an externalist  conception, and we show that these two
views are rooted in the metaphysical opposition between  substance  on the one hand,  and
continuity on the other hand. 
   At least since the seventeenth century, two philosophical definitions of identity as sameness
have fought: according to the first (identity-substance), a being is the same being by remaining
the same substance, that is by virtue of maintaining a metaphysical core throughout changes;
according to the second (identity-continuity), a being remains the same simply because of the
spatiotemporal  connexion  between  its  constituants  (if  the  connexion  is  broken,  identity
vanishes).  More precisely, identity as  substance is  based on the idea that,  in  spite  of the
changes  that  affect  any  individual  entity,  there  is  a  metaphysical  core that  is  preserved
throughout time. This core is supposed to explain why an adult is the same being as the child
he was, even if there are very few similarities between his two conditions, or why an acorn is
the  same  being  as  the  oak  tree  it  becomes.  Thus,  the  concept  of  substance  is  a  way to
understand sameness: the immutability of the metaphysical core of each individual assures its
identity and preserves its integrity. Such a conception of identity can be found in Aristotle's
Categories (Chapter 5, 3b22-33 and 4b18-19) and Metaphysics (Book D). It can be found in
contemporary philosophy, also. For instance, Wiggins leans on Aristotle's thought to suggest
"an unmysterious but pre-empiricist notion of substance" (2001: 80): continuity of states by
itself does not define identity, there is a something to which these states belong9.
   The philosophical opposition between substance and continuity is best illustrated by the
answer Leibniz, in his New Essays concerning human understanding (1765, written in 1704),
gave  to  Locke's  Essay  concerning  human  understanding (1690).  According  to  the  view
expressed in the New Essays, the individual substance (or 'monad') defines and creates itself,
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that  is,  is the continuous  source of its  own predicates:  activity is  an inherent force in the
individual substance, and only  limitation  to this activity can come from the outside. As a
consequence,  an  individual  substance  is  closed  to  the  outside,  as  confirmed  by  the
Monadology:  "The Monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go
out" (Leibniz 1714). Thus, Leibniz suggests an internal definition of substance, insisting on
the process of self-definition and of enclosure of each metaphysical being10. This conception
of individual substance constitutes a  specification  with regard to the broader definition of
identity-substance:  the  broad conception  (as  illustrated  by Aristotle)  relies  on the  idea  of
maintaining the metaphysical core of the individual, whereas the conception expressed in the
New Essays goes further by asserting that this preservation supposes a self-definition and an
enclosure of the individual being.
   Leibniz's conception must be understood as a reaction to Locke's complex definition of
identity in his Essay concerning human understanding (1690). Locke, although he admits the
existence of substances, proposes a radical critique of the scholastic conception of substance,
asserting that  we only have  a  very imprecise  and  hypothetical  conception  of what  is  the
substrate  we suppose when we conceive of a bundle of ideas (Locke 1690: II, 23, §2). In
accordance with this critique, Locke defines individual identity for all living beings as a mere
continuity, with no need for a metaphysical (and unreachable) substrate. Only continuity can
justify the fact that, in spite of changes, an individual being remains the same (Locke 1690: II,
27, §4).
   Leibniz's answer (1765) is clearly an attempt to preserve the definition of identity-substance
that Locke criticizes. According to Leibniz, only substance as a  substrate can give a proper
account of the metaphysical unity and identity of any being:
The organization or configuration without a subsisting principle of life, which I call a monad, would not
suffice  to  cause  the  continuance  of  idem numero  or  the  same individual. (Leibniz  1765:  II,  27,  4,
translation adapted from Langley).11
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   We agree with Locke's suspicion: if the substance is impossible to reach, why should we
presuppose it? Locke's thought here can be seen as an illustration of Occam's razor: if a given
phenomenon can be explained by two models, one of which uses more hypotheses than the
other, then we should favor the minimal model. 
   Hume (Hume 1739), following in Locke's footsteps, resumes and strengthens the definition
of  identity  as  continuity.  No  one  better  than  Hume  demonstrates  the  impossibility  of
conceiving of a substantial self, and the necessity of conceiving of identity as a continuity of
states, and not on the basis of a chimeric metaphysical substrate. Hume shows that there is no
need to assume the existence of a substrate in order to understand the identity of a plant, of an
animal, or of the mind; besides, it is impossible to conceive of such a substrate, since we only
have particular impressions of things, and never a general impression of the metaphysical core
of a being. Thus, identity is only the continuity of articulated states (Hume 1739: I, IV, VI).
Accordingly,  the  transition  from  continuity  to  the  idea  that  a  substrate  grounds  identity
(identity-substance) is a mistake, that makes us "run into the  notion of a soul,  and self,  and
substance, to disguise the variation [of objects]" (I, IV, VI, Par. 6/23: 253).
   Hume's  position  is  the  realization  of  the  metaphysical  deflation  with  regard  to  the
substantialist  conception.  Identity,  and  especially  the  self,  not  only  do  not  need  to  be
understood on  the  basis  of  a  metaphysical  substrate  (a  core  whose  integrity is  preserved
throughout time), but also cannot be understood this way, because we have no possible access
to  such  a  substrate.  In the  second  part  of  this  section,  we  attempt  to  justify the  parallel
between the philosophical debate between substance and continuity, and the immunological
debate between self and continuity. 
   The immune self/non-self model can be said to uphold a  substantialist view of identity,
because the immunological conception of the self is grounded on the idea of preservation of
the integrity of the organism, integrity which must be maintained against any external threat,
exactly  like  the  individual  substance  is  defined  on  the  basis  of  its  always  preserved
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metaphysical core. More than this: the immune self/non-self model holds a monadologic view
of identity, that is, it conceives of identity as self-defining and enclosed: the immune system
"knows" itself, and every change that comes from the inside is tolerable (acceptable), whereas
every change that comes from the outside ('foreign') is to be rejected. Thus, in several of his
books (see particularly Burnet 1962 and Burnet 1969), Burnet emphasizes the two main ideas
of self-knowledge and preservation (exactly like a monad): 
   It is one of the concise statements of modern immunology that the body will accept as itself only what
is genetically indistinguishable from the part replaced. ...  It is  as if the body can recognize its own
individuality and will accept nothing that is inconsistent with that individuality (1962: 13-14).
   Furthermore, contemporary immunology provides constant illustrations of this monadologic
conception. Here follows one example:
Thus, we envision self-nonself discrimination as being mediated by both arms of the immune response
[that is, innate immunity and adaptative immunity]. The innate immune response to pathogen-associated
molecular patterns (PAMPs) distinguishes non-infectious self from infectious nonself, and does so with
great accuracy. The adaptive immune system of lymphocytes is basically self-referential, being selected
positively for the recognition of self-peptide:self-MHC molecules, and negatively selected by those self-
ligands that are able to activate developing T cells to induce programmed cell death. … However, for
full activation in the peripheral tissues, they need to see antigen on the same cell as the expression of the
co-stimulatory molecules induced by innate immune recognition of  foreign  PAMPs. (Medzhitov and
Janeway 2000, our emphasis). 
   Here, the ideas that the immune system is self-centred, and that only foreign antigens can
induce  an  actual  immune  response,  are  clearly  expressed.  As  we  see,  the  immune  'self'
consists  of  the  unfolding  of  internal  processes  (self-definition),  the  result  of  which  must
always be defended against any external presence (enclosure). In other words, the immune
self/non-self model can be said to support a monadologic conception of identity in the sense
that it is based on integrity, internalism and enclosure. In the self/nonself framework, the self
production  of  any organism  is  understood  as  the  harmonious  unfolding  of  individuality,
whereas foreignness appears as a threat on the integrity of that individuality (Klein 198212).
   The continuity hypothesis, on the other hand, conceives of identity as an identity-continuity,
since it claims that nothing more than the spatiotemporal continuity of adhesions between
immune receptors and ligands defines immune identity. This hypothesis can therefore be seen
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as the immunological point of view on the identity of organisms, as Boniolo and Carrara very
recently defined it (2004)13. According to the continuity hypothesis, nothing like a permanent
'core'  to  be  preserved  against  all  foreign  threats  is  presupposed  and  thought  to  define
immunity.  Changes  from the  inside  and changes  from the  outside  equally can trigger  an
immune  response,  depending  on  the  conditions  of  encounter  we  described  above.  The
continuity hypothesis, thus, suggests that the same kind of metaphysical deflation operated by
Locke and Hume in philosophy as far as substance is concerned can be made in immunology
with regard to the 'self'. The  principle of  economy  must be applied to immunology, which
must rid itself of its most excessive substantialist metaphysical foundations, since they are
useless and even misleading.
   These implicit metaphysical conceptions seem critical to us, if one wants to understand the
theoretical  framework  of  immunology.  We  believe,  above  all,  that  the  identity-substance
(monad) which underlies the immune self/non-self model plays not a small role in the way
this  model  misleads  people  in  their  theoretical  views  and  experiments.  Is  it  possible,
nonetheless, to consider that the continuity hypothesis is a better explanation than the self
hypothesis without accepting the idea that the two models have the metaphysical foundations
we described (that is, substance versus continuity)? We think it is indeed possible, but we
believe firmly that it would be missing the importance of the deep roots of the self model that
explain its origins, as well as its persistence throughout time. 
   In the next section, we show that the continuity hypothesis tends to belong to the externalist
views of biological  identity, and we suggest  that  adopting these  views would offer  many
advantages to current biology.
6. Theoretical status of the continuity hypothesis
   The continuity hypothesis shares a feature with the theories of the immune 'system' or
'network' (Jerne 1974, Cohen 1992, Atlan and Cohen 1998, Tauber 2000, and, for a use of the
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very questionable concept of 'autopoiesis', Maturana and Varela 1980): immune reactions are
defined as perturbations of the system. Within the continuity hypothesis, an immune reaction
follows the arrival of an unusual entity (break of continuity). Nonetheless, there is a critical
difference between the two theoretical frameworks: in the theories of the immune network,
the critique of the distinction between 'self' and 'non-self' relies on the assertion that there is
only  the  'self'.  Indeed,  autoreactivity  is  seen  as  essential  and  as  the  basic  definition  of
immunity: the immune system constantly reacts to self constituants, hence autoimmunity is
not  a  dysfunction,  but  the  basis  of  normal  immunity (Cohen  2000).  In  other  words,  the
immune system always reacts to itself because it 'sees' only itself (Jerne 1974). Thus, network
theories  hold  an  even  stronger  internalist  view  than  the  'self'  model.  By  contrast,  the
continuity hypothesis moves towards externalism: relying on the induction of continuity, this
hypothesis attempts to explain the relative openness of organisms. Biological identity is seen
as  continuous and  open, which means that it is defined as a succession of states without a
permanent core, and that integration of 'foreign' elements is in many circumstances a normal
and necessary process in organisms. This relative openness, explained here by the induction of
continuity,  reflects  a  great  variety  of  known  phenomena,  such  as  the  bacterial  origin  of
mitochondria in our cells (Margulis and Chapman 1998, Martin and Müller 1998), all kinds of
chimerisms  and  particularly  foetomaternal  chimerism  (Bianchi  et  al.  1996),  and
environmentally dependent development (Gilbert 2002). This view provides a basis for the
externalist  or  rather  'heterogeneous'  view  of  biological  identity  (supported  by  Lewontin
200014)  in  the field  where it  is  the least  expected,  because of the vision of organisms as
fortresses, the integrity of which has constantly to be preserved, that is, immunology. 
7. Conclusion
   The self/non-self model and its vocabulary are inadequate and misleading. The continuity
hypothesis  offers  a  more  comprehensive  and less  metaphysically loaded theory to  give  a
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proper account of immunological phenomena. It is time to apply to immunology the principle
of  metaphysical  deflation,  that  is,  to  operate  a  transition  from  identity-substance  (self
hypothesis)  to  identity-continuity  (continuity hypothesis).  The  monadologic conception  of
identity  that  underlies  implicitly  the  self/non-self  model  is  based  on  self-definition  and
enclosure.  This  monadologic  (ultra-internalist)  conception  can  be  found,  in  addition  to
immunology, in other parts of biology, particularly genetics, with the idea that the individual
can be defined as  the unfolding of  the  genetic  information contained in  the  ADN of  the
nucleus  of  his  cells,  and  development  (Lewontin  2000,  Oyama  1985).  By  contrast,  the
continuity hypothesis enables us to understand identity as an open and integrative identity,
constructed by the interrelations of an organism and its environment. 
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whereas cancer cells undergo multiple genetic alterations; the transcriptome in normal cells is stable, whereas cancer
cells are characterized by a major epigenetic instability; no tissue invasion occurs with normal cells, whereas there is
invasion and metastasis with cancer cells; normal cells have a stable pattern of cytokine and growth factor expression,
by contrast with cancer cells which have an abnormal expression of cytokines and growth factors (Pardoll 2003).
9 "Wherever the sortal concept under which a and b coincide is the sortal concept for a kind of continuant and one can
ask 'what is it for an f to persist?', it is the idea of a sequential history of a thing's doings and undergoings that comes into
consideration. ... As Leibniz puts the point that I too have wanted to insist upon, 'By itself continuity no more constitutes
substance than does multitude or number … Something is necessary to be numbered, repeated and continued'" (Wiggins
2001: 57). 
10 To be strictly accurate, Leibniz offers actually  two different conceptions of individual substance. In the first one,
expressed up to the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), the specific predicates of an individual substance are guaranteed
in God, who is the only one to know all the characteristics of each being. The second conception is for the first time
expressed explicitly in the key text "De primae philosophiae emendatione et de notione substantiae" (1694), and appears
in the New Essays. The difference is that, in the first conception, the individual substance merely expresses what exists
in the whole universe, whereas in the second conception the individual substance generates by itself its attributes. Thus,
Leibniz goes from an external to an internal definition of substance, insisting on the process of  self-definition and of
enclosure of each metaphysical being. 
11 It is worth noting that it  is  exactly the same idea that is expressed by contemporary supporters of substance: cf.
Wiggins (2001: 57)
12 "An organism is a miracle of harmony. Its individual parts have divided among themselves the functions necessary for
the sustenance of life and interact with one another in a complex but precisely defined manner. However, this delicate
system of  interactions  can easily be  disturbed  by any agent  that  endangers  the body's integrity."  (Klein 1982:  3).
Wiggins himself attempts to suggest an internalist description of biological substances: "But now we are led by simple
conceptual considerations to precisely the account of living substances that biologists can fill out a posteriori by treating
them as systems open to their surroundings, not in equilibrium with those surroundings, but so constituted that a delicate
self-regulating balance of serially linked enzymatic degradative and synthesizing chemical reactions enables them to
renew themselves" (Wiggins 2001: 86).
13 In their paper (2004), Boniolo and Carrara even deal with immunological identity, but, since it is not specifically their
problem, they do not elaborate the point. We believe that our definition of immune identity as based on the continuity
hypothesis can be seen as an instance of their suggestion: in their terms, the continuity hypothesis reflects the particular
immunological point of view V on organisms and, therefore, the particular isolation of N immune properties Pi (i=1,…,
N). 
14 Lewontin’s dialectical conception of organisms rejects externalism as far as evolution is concerned and internalism as
far as development and maintenance of organisms are concerned (Godfrey-Smith 2001). Our use of Lewontin’s thought
deals with the second aspect. In this sense, Lewontin writes: “Organisms are internally heterogeneous open systems”
(2000: 114). 
